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ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: NEW YORK'S
MEASURE OF DAMAGES-BENEFIT-
OF-THE-BARGAIN?
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME ...
JACOB L. TODRESt
Recently I had occasion to examine the New York measure of
damages in tax malpractice situations.' During this work I was
struck by the realization that with respect to such malpractice
causes of action there does not appear to be a clear, well-defined
articulation of the applicable measure of damages in New York.
This was especially perplexing because in both breach of contract
and fraud situations, the measure of damages is well defined.
For breach of contract, an injured party may recover "benefit-of-
the-bargain" damages,2 while a defrauded party is entitled to
recover "out-of-pocket" damages.3 Both of these measures of
damages are clearly established by the Court of Appeals,4 and the
labels are rather attractive and elegant. In tax malpractice, and
in attorney malpractice in general, there simply is no analog.
To the extent there is any attempt to generalize the measure
of damages in negligence situations, which includes tax
malpractice, the courts state that the injured party is to be made
"whole."' Unfortunately, this seems to be a goal rather than a
I Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges invaluable suggestions by Andrew J. Simons, Vice Dean Emeritus, St
John's University School of Law, and the excellent research assistance and
suggestions of Rae Kahle Buse, class of 2012.
1 Jacob L. Todres, New York's Law of Tax Malpractice Damages: Balanced or
Biased? 86 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 143 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97,
403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978).
3 See, e.g., Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 668 N.E.2d
1370, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1996).
4 See supra notes 2-3.
6 See, e.g., Martin, 43 N.Y.2d at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
See also Scalp & Blade, Inc. v. Advest, Inc., 309 A.D.2d 219, 225, 765 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97
(4th Dep't 2003).
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measure of damages. The problem is that there is no fixed
definition of what it means to be made "whole." It depends
entirely on how "whole" is defined. "To be made whole" has
different meanings in different contexts. Thus, to be made whole
has been applied with respect to damages from personal injury,6
breach of contract,' negligence or strict products liability,8 and
breach of fiduciary duty by an executor' and by an escrow
agent,o despite the fact that the measure of damages may be
different in each situation. The Fourth Department was very
perceptive when, with respect to a complaint that alleged causes
of action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of
contract and fraud, it stated: "While the precise measure of
damages may vary under each of those theories, there can be no
doubt that, under all of them, the 'object of compensatory
damages' is the same, i.e., to make the plaintiff 'whole.'""
While it might be asymmetrical and a bit intellectually
troubling that there is no attractive and pithy catch phrase
describing the negligence measure of damages, as there is for
fraud and breach of contract damages, I do not wish to address
the entire negligence area. Negligence seems to be very broad
and to include many disparate segments. For instance, it
includes personal injuries by automobiles and other means,
medical malpractice, damage to property, malpractice by all
types of professionals, etc. Many of these areas have developed
unique rules to deal with their unique circumstances. I assume
the existence of these many different adaptations prevent the
broad negligence area from being susceptible to one simple,
catchy description. I certainly am unable to suggest one.
However, I wish to focus solely on one segment of the negligence
' See, e.g., Buchner v. Pines Hotel, Inc., 87 A.D.2d 691, 693, 448 N.Y.S.2d 870,
872 (3d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1019, 448 N.E.2d 1347, 462 N.Y.S.2d 436(1983); Carr v. Third Colony Corp., 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 40400(U), 2001 WL 1606662,
at *10 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings Cnty. Nov. 9, 2001).
7 See Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 2008 WL 5129084 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cnty. May, 20, 2008).
* See Martin, 43 N.Y.2d at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
9 In re Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 322, 372 N.E.2d 291, 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449, 456(1977).
10 Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz &
Mendelsohn, 165 Misc. 2d 539, 546, 634 N.Y.S.2d 609, 615 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.
1994), affd, 227 A.D.2d 106, 642 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1st Dep't 1996).
1n Scalp & Blade, Inc. v. Advest, Inc., 309 A.D.2d 219, 225, 765 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97(4th Dep't 2003) (citations omitted).
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area. It is the thesis of this Article that the traditional measure
of damages in New York in all attorney malpractice situations,
including tax malpractice, is essentially the same as the breach
of contract measure of damages, that is, benefit-of-the-bargain
damages. This is based primarily upon the definition of each
measure of damages. It is also buttressed by cases that indicate
that in attorney malpractice situations the damages recoverable
are the same regardless of whether the cause of action is framed
in tort, that is, negligence, or breach of contract.12
This thesis is probably not very novel. In Solon v. Domino,
the Southern District trial judge directly sidestepped addressing
this issue: "[tiabling the legal question whether benefit-of-the-
bargain damages are recoverable in a negligence action under
New York law."'4 Presumably, this was in response to the
plaintiffs' suggestion that benefit-of-the-bargain damages were
the appropriate remedy in that tax malpractice situation. 5
Before proceeding, I wish to emphasize that my thesis is that
New York's traditional measure of damages in attorney
malpractice cases is essentially the same as the benefit-of-the-
bargain measure of damages of contract law. In recent years,
courts in New York seem to have strayed from the traditional
measure of damages in tax malpractice situations. Instead, they
seem to have applied the fraud, out-of-pocket measure of
damages. 6 In a recent article, 7 I argued extensively that this
deviation is wrong and seems to have occurred inadvertently
rather than in a principled manner. Later cases involving
negligently rendered incorrect tax advice simply followed the
holding in a prior case' 8 involving incorrect tax advice without
12 See, e.g., Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 42, 555
N.E.2d 611, 613, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (1990); Santulli v. Englert, Reilly &
McHugh, P.C., 164 A.D.2d 149, 152, 563 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (3d Dep't 1990) (Casey,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), modified, 78 N.Y.2d 700, 586 N.E.2d
1014, 579 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1992).
13 No. 08 Civ. 2837 (SCR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
2009).
14 Id. at *9.
15 Id. at *7-9. Solin treated the case as if the defendant were a professional
advisor-that is, an attorney or accountant. In fact, the defendant was a financial
advisor and it is unclear whether New York law recognizes malpractice claims
against financial advisors. Id. at *2, *11-12.
16 Todres, supra note 1.
17 Id.
18 Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1st Dep't 1990).
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focusing on the fact that the prior case involved only fraud causes
of action, which have a much narrower measure of damages than
the traditional negligence measure of damages in these
situations.19
The benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages for breach of
contract seems to be long established and quite well understood.
In an early case 20 in which the New York Court of Appeals was
contrasting contract damages and fraudulent misrepresentation
damages, it described breach of contract damages as follows:
The measure of damages which flows from a breach of contract
is the difference between the value of what has been received
under the contract and the value of what would have been
received if the contract had been performed according to its
terms. Damages there are not limited to indemnity for loss
suffered through the making of the contract. The injured party
is entitled to the benefit of his bargain as written and is entitled
to damages for the loss caused by failure to perform the
stipulated bargain. That loss may include the profits which he
would have derived from performance of the contract. 21
In a more recent case,2 2 the New York Court of Appeals
essentially reiterated this earlier formulation:
[A] cause of action for breach of warranty is a contractual
remedy[-]a remedy which seeks to provide the parties with the
benefit of their bargain. It is, in essence, a remedy designed to
enforce the agreement, express or implied, of the parties and to
19 Under New York's "out-of-pocket" measure of damages for fraud, a defrauded
plaintiff may recover only the difference between the amount paid and what was
actually received in return. Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 553, 124 N.E. 144, 146(1919). No recovery is available for any element of lost profit. Id. Nor is any
cognizance taken of what was promised. In negligence, under New York's traditional
measure of damages, a plaintiff may recover the difference between his present
pecuniary position and what his position would have been without the negligence,including lost profit. Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 280, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 796 (2d
Dep't 1912). See infra text accompanying notes 24-33. It is most surprising and
counterintuitive that greater damages are awarded in negligence, involving an
inadvertent error, than in fraud, involving intentional, egregious conduct. This
demands attention and change! For a more detailed review of the fraud and
negligence measures of damages, see infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
20 Sager v. Friedman, 270 N.Y. 472, 1 N.E.2d 971 (1936).
21 Id. at 481, 1 N.E.2d at 974.




place them, should one of the parties fail to perform in
accordance with the agreement, in the same position they would
have been had the agreement been performed.23
Many similar formulations abound in the lower courts.24
To summarize, contractual benefit-of-the-bargain damages
are designed to place the injured party in the same position she
or he would have been if the agreement had been performed.
And these damages include any profits lost as a result of the
breach.
While I have been unable to trace the traditional attorney
malpractice measure of damages to an early Court of Appeals
case, I have traced it back one hundred years to the Second
Department in Flynn v. Judge.2 5 In Flynn the plaintiffs sued
their attorney alleging that his negligent advice caused them to
be removed as executors and trustees of their father's estate and
therefore caused them the loss of the commission income from
these positions.2 6 In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' causes of action, the Second Department stated:
[Tihe measure of damages is the difference in the pecuniary
position of the client from what it should have been had the
attorney acted without negligence. 27
The court then quoted the following:
'In actions against attorneys for negligence or wrongs, the debt
lost and cost sustained through their negligence furnish, when
the action can be maintained, the obvious measure of damages,
23 Id. at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 99-100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188. See also Brushton-
Moira Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Fred H. Thomas Assocs., 91 N.Y.2d 256, 261, 692 N.E.2d
551, 553, 669 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (1998) ("Damages are intended to return the parties
to the point at which the breach arose and to place the nonbreaching party in as
good a position as it would have been had the contract been performed.").
24 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Pierce, 57 A.D.3d 1348, 1351-52, 870 N.Y.S.2d 161, 165
(3d Dep't 2008) (quoting Brushton-Moira Cent. Sch. Dist., 91 N.Y.2d at 261, 692
N.E.2d at 553, 669 N.Y.S.2d at 522); Mafias v. VMS Assocs., 53 A.D.3d 451, 454, 863
N.Y.S.2d 4, 7 (1st Dep't 2008) (quoting Brushton-Moira Cent. Sch. Dist., 91 N.Y.2d at
261, 692 N.E.2d at 553, 669 N.Y.S.2d at 522); Scalp & Blade, Inc. v. Advest, Inc., 309
A.D.2d 219, 225, 765 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97 (4th Dep't 2003) (quoting Campagnola v.
Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 42, 555 N.E.2d 611, 613, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239,
241 (1990)); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 22, 465
N.Y.S.2d 606, 618 (4th Dep't 1983) (quoting Sager, 270 N.Y. at 481, 1 N.E.2d at 974
(1936)).
25 149 A.D. 278, 133 N.Y.S. 794 (2d Dep't 1912).
26 Id. at 279, 133 N.Y.S. at 795-96. Plaintiffs alleged that they also incurred
certain other losses. Id. at 279, 133 N.Y.S. at 796.
27 Id. at 280, 133 N.Y.S. at 796.
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where this measure definitely exists. In other cases the
plaintiff is entitled to be in the same position as if the attorney
had done his duty.' 8
Recently, the Court of Appeals addressed the proper
measure of damages in an attorney malpractice situation in
Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe.29 The issue before
the court in Campagnola was the amount of damages recoverable
by an injured plaintiff from his negligent attorney who was
retained to prosecute an action for personal injuries.a0 The
retainer agreement provided for a contingent fee to the attorney
based on any recovery obtained. Due to the attorney's negligence
in failing to give notice to the plaintiffs insurance company, a
potential recovery of the $100,000 face amount of the insurance
policy was lost. The issue the court had to decide was whether
the maximum recoverable damage award was the full $100,000
or whether the $100,000 was to be reduced by the contingent fee
percentage-one-third-that would have been payable to the
attorney under the contingent fee arrangement." In addressing
the measure of damages, the court stated that "[tihe object of
compensatory damages is to make the injured client whole.
Where the injury suffered is the loss of a cause of action, the
measure of damages is generally the value of the claim lost."S2
While the majority's opinion seems generally consistent with
Flynn's measure of damages, it is ambiguous about what it
means to make the injured client "whole." The concurring
opinion by Judge Kaye is much more explicit:
In lawyer malpractice cases, as in all negligence cases, the focus
in damages inquiries must be on the injured plaintiff-not on
whether damages will unduly harm the wrongdoer defendant-
the objective being to put the injured plaintiff in as good a
position as she would have been in had there been no breach of
duty. 3
28 Id. (quoting EDWARD P. WEEKS & CHARLES T. BOONE, A TREATISE ON
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW § 319 (2d ed. 1892)).
29 76 N.Y.2d 38, 555 N.E.2d 611, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990).
30 Id. at 40-41, 555 N.E.2d at 611-12, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 239-40.
" Id. at 40-41, 555 N.E.2d at 612, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 240. The court held that the
full $100,000 was recoverable. Id. at 41, 555 N.E.2d at 612-13, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 240-
41.
32 Id. at 42, 555 N.E.2d at 613, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
33 Id. at 45-46, 555 N.E.2d at 615, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 243 (Kaye, J., concurring).
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As augmented by Judge Kaye's concurrence, the
Campagnola measure of damages seems to be the same measure
of damages as articulated in Flynn. A subsequent lower court
opinion further clarifies this:
[Dlamages for malpractice are also limited to pecuniary loss-
i.e., the difference between the actual result achieved and that
which should have been accomplished, and the financial loss
thereby sustained."
Additionally, the well-known New York requirement that in
a malpractice action against an attorney there often needs to be a
trial within a trial" is simply a direct application of the Flynn
traditional measure of damages. The "trial" of the underlying
lost or botched cause of action within the malpractice trial is
simply the method utilized to establish what the negligent
attorney should have accomplished, which is the reference point
in defining the extent of the recoverable injury suffered by the
injured plaintiff.
The traditional Flynn measure of damages in attorney
malpractice situations is that the injured plaintiff is entitled to
recover the difference between his present pecuniary position and
what it would have been had the negligent attorney acted
without negligence." When this is compared with contract
benefit-of-the-bargain damages it seems to be essentially the
same. In benefit-of-the-bargain damages the injured party is
entitled to the difference between the value of what was received
under the contract and the value of what would have been
received if the contract had been performed according to its
terms. In both situations the damages are the difference
between what should have been received (that is, non-negligent
representation by the attorney or full performance of the
34 Sanders v. Rosen, 159 Misc. 2d 563, 572, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805, 810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Cnty. 1993). See also Lewis v. Alper, 15 A.D.2d 795, 796, 224 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (2d
Dep't 1962) (Hopkins, J. concurring) (discussing how provable damages are "the
difference in the plaintiffs' pecuniary position from what it should have been had the
defendant acted without negligence").
35 See e.g., McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 280 A.D.2d 79, 82, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654,
656-57 (4th Dep't 2001); 3 Cottage Place LLC v. Cohen, Tauber, Spievack &
Wagner, LLP, 2008 N.Y. Slip. Op. 30538, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8343 at *10-11
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 25, 2008); Alva v. Hurley, Fox, Selig, Caprari & Kelleher,
156 Misc. 2d 550, 555, 593 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (Sup. Ct. Rock. Cnty. 1993).
36 Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 280, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 796 (2d Dep't 1912).
31 Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589, 374 N.E.2d 97, 99-
100, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (1978).
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contract) and what was actually received. These seem identical
but for terminology differences needed to describe the different
contexts-negligent representation of a client versus non-
performance of a contractual obligation.
It should be noted that in attorney malpractice situations
there are two different relevant potential causes of action. The
first is the traditional negligence cause of action that has been
assumed herein. A second cause of action could be framed in
terms of breach of contract, that is, that by his negligent
representation, the attorney breached his contract to represent
the client in an expected workmanlike, non-negligent manner.
While both causes of action seem viable, there are a number of
cases that hold the recovery is the same, and the cause of action
is essentially for negligence.8 This is consistent with some
rather longstanding New York authority that in a civil action,
whether in tort or contract, the damages should be the same,
apart from the possibility of punitive damages in appropriate tort
situations."
In conclusion, since the New York measure of damages in
attorney malpractice situations appears to be the same as in
breach of contract situations, it would be refreshingly
appropriate for them to be referred to by the same name-that is,
benefit-of-the-bargain damages. In both situations the law seeks
to make an injured plaintiff whole by awarding her or him the
difference between their present financial situation and what it
would have been had the other party-the attorney or the other
contracting person-performed as required.
There seem to be two possible objections to simply extending
the "benefit-of-the-bargain" label to attorney malpractice
situations. The first arises from an abundance of caution that
jurists typically display. Though the basic measure of damages
seems to be the same, there is no certainty that they are
absolutely identical. Some difference between the two may lurk
in some crack or crevice of the complexities that may arise in
each area. Why go out on a limb and suggest the rules are
identical?
" See supra note 12.
3 See Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 220 (1873); Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28,
31, 73 N.E. 488, 489 (1905). Both of these cases were recently followed by the Court
of Appeals in Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 42, 555
N.E.2d 611, 613, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (1990).
960 [Vol. 86:953
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: DAMAGES
The second objection is based upon a fundamental principle
embodied in New York law. The Court of Appeals has recognized
that "[t]he unique relationship between an attorney and client,
founded in principle upon the elements of trust and confidence on
the part of the client and of undivided loyalty and devotion on the
part of the attorney, remains one of the most sensitive and
confidential relationships in our society."40  Based on this
rationale the Court of Appeals held that traditional contract
principles will not always apply in attorney client disputes.4 1
Because of this policy, perhaps the courts would not wish to
extend the contract "benefit-of-the-bargain" terminology to
attorney malpractice situations, lest the special status of the
attorney-client relationship be blurred or diminished thereby.
In response to these concerns I suggest that the attorney
malpractice measure of damages area would still benefit from
having an appropriately descriptive, pithy catch-phrase. If not
"benefit-of-the bargain," I suggest that the measure of damages
be referred to as "expectancy" damages," that is, the difference
between the client's current pecuniary position and what it would
have been had the required legal services been rendered, in an
appropriate, non-negligent manner.
40 Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 428 N.E.2d 387,
389, 444 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (1981).
41 Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 43-44, 555 N.E.2d at 613-14, 556 N.Y.S.2d at
241-42.
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